No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects — Paper

Abstract

-cross Abstract: We study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous objects when screening uses costly effort rather than monetary transfers. No-screening mechanisms perform well as object variety increases. In a symmetric continuous market with i.i.d. values whose CDF is log-concave, the multidimensional problem reduces exactly to a single-dimensional problem in agents' best-option values. More options make low best-option values rarer, weakening the case for screening. We characterize when no screening is optimal and show it remains optimal as variety expands. Large-variety limits and numerical results for finite, correlated markets support this pattern. We apply these results to propose an invitation-based vaccine appointment system.

Authors 2

Shunya Noda, Genta Okada

Specification

Official page: arxiv.org/abs/2408.10077
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 7 h agohigh
Arxiv announce type: replace
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 7 h agohigh
arXiv id: 2408.10077
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 7 h agohigh
Categories: econ.TH, cs.AI, cs.GT, cs.LG
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 7 h agohigh
PDF: arxiv.org/pdf/2408.10077
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 7 h agohigh
Primary category: econ.TH
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 7 h agohigh
Published: 11 Sept 2026
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 7 h agohigh

Each value shows its source, tier and observation time. Conflicting claims are kept side by side and flagged — never averaged. How AI Atlas records facts →

Provenance

Attributed facts

9

Source tiers

T19

Freshest observation

7 h ago

Conflicts

None

No models linked to this paper yet.

Authors: Shunya Noda, Genta Okada

As of

Rewind the record: see this entity's attributes exactly as AI Atlas knew them on a given day.

Claim history · Abstract

1 claims · 1 propertiesShow all properties

Abstractabstract1

Claim history for Abstract
Value	Valid from → to	Status	Source	Confidence	Extractor
-cross Abstract: We study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous objects when screening uses costly effort rather than monetary transfers. No-screening mechanisms perform well as object variety increases. In a symmetric continuous market with i.i.d. values whose CDF is log-concave, the multidimensional problem reduces exactly to a single-dimensional problem in agents' best-option values. More options make low best-option values rarer, weakening the case for screening. We characterize when no screening is optimal and show it remains optimal as variety expands. Large-variety limits and numerical results for finite, correlated markets support this pattern. We apply these results to propose an invitation-based vaccine appointment system.	11 Sept 2026 21:02 UTC → current	current	arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1	high	deterministic

Claims are temporal and append-only: a new observation closes the previous claim (valid_to) instead of overwriting it. Conflicting claims from different sources are kept side by side and flagged — never averaged. Methodology →

11 Sept 2026
New paperPaperNo Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects
New paper: No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects
arxiv
rss.arxiv.org

Full timeline →

Source documents
Source	Document	Type	Tier	Last observed	Snapshots
arXiv (Atom API + RSS)	rss.arxiv.org/rss/cs.LG	feed	T1· Official	6 h ago	1

Tier 1 = official/primary, 2 = quality secondary, 3 = community, 4 = unverified. Every snapshot is archived; see all sources and the methodology.