Updated 2 h ago · first seen 11 Sept 2026
paper_01M294FSPKHHRVFZ6NW490JBT4
- Published
- 11 Sept 2026
- T1 · 2 h ago
- arXiv
- 2408.10077
- T1 · 2 h ago
- Category
- econ.TH
- T1 · 2 h ago
Abstract
-cross Abstract: We study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous objects when screening uses costly effort rather than monetary transfers. No-screening mechanisms perform well as object variety increases. In a symmetric continuous market with i.i.d. values whose CDF is log-concave, the multidimensional problem reduces exactly to a single-dimensional problem in agents' best-option values. More options make low best-option values rarer, weakening the case for screening. We characterize when no screening is optimal and show it remains optimal as variety expands. Large-variety limits and numerical results for finite, correlated markets support this pattern. We apply these results to propose an invitation-based vaccine appointment system.
Authors 2
Shunya Noda, Genta Okada
Specification
- Official page
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 2 h agohigh
- Arxiv announce type
- replace
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 2 h agohigh
- arXiv id
- 2408.10077
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 2 h agohigh
- Categories
- econ.TH, cs.AI, cs.GT, cs.LG
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 2 h agohigh
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 2 h agohigh
- Primary category
- econ.TH
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 2 h agohigh
- Published
- 11 Sept 2026
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 2 h agohigh
Each value shows its source, tier and observation time. Conflicting claims are kept side by side and flagged — never averaged. How AI Atlas records facts →
Provenance
Attributed facts
9
Source tiers
T19
Freshest observation
2 h ago
Conflicts
None
No models linked to this paper yet.
- Authors
- Shunya Noda, Genta Okada
As of
Rewind the record: see this entity's attributes exactly as AI Atlas knew them on a given day.
Claim history
Official pageofficial_url1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| https://arxiv.org/abs/2408.10077 | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Abstractabstract1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| -cross Abstract: We study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous objects when screening uses costly effort rather than monetary transfers. No-screening mechanisms perform well as object variety increases. In a symmetric continuous market with i.i.d. values whose CDF is log-concave, the multidimensional problem reduces exactly to a single-dimensional problem in agents' best-option values. More options make low best-option values rarer, weakening the case for screening. We characterize when no screening is optimal and show it remains optimal as variety expands. Large-variety limits and numerical results for finite, correlated markets support this pattern. We apply these results to propose an invitation-based vaccine appointment system. | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Arxiv announce typearxiv_announce_type1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| replace | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
arXiv idarxiv_id1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2408.10077 | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Categoriescategories1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| econ.TH, cs.AI, cs.GT, cs.LG | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
PDFpdf_url1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| https://arxiv.org/pdf/2408.10077 | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Primary categoryprimary_category1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| econ.TH | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Publishedpublished_at1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11 Sept 2026 | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Claims are temporal and append-only: a new observation closes the previous claim (valid_to) instead of overwriting it. Conflicting claims from different sources are kept side by side and flagged — never averaged. Methodology →
New paper: No Screening is More Efficient with Multiple Objects
arxiv
| Source | Document | Type | Tier | Last observed | Snapshots |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| arXiv (Atom API + RSS) | rss.arxiv.org/rss/cs.LG | feed | T1· Official | 2 h ago | 1 |
Tier 1 = official/primary, 2 = quality secondary, 3 = community, 4 = unverified. Every snapshot is archived; see all sources and the methodology.