Updated 2 h ago · first seen 11 Sept 2026
paper_01M294GPCR19REVGSCT4TAV95R
- Published
- 11 Sept 2026
- T1 · 2 h ago
- arXiv
- 2301.12884
- T1 · 2 h ago
- Category
- cs.GT
- T1 · 2 h ago
Abstract
-cross Abstract: Algorithmic recourse promises to help applicants rejected by automated systems by explaining the changes needed to secure acceptance. What incentive do decision-makers, such as banks and employers, have to offer recourse? We study this question in a screening model in which recourse is both productive and selective: completing recourse improves an applicant's value to the decision-maker, but applicants differ in their cost of completion. The optimal policy is a threshold rule: reject applicants with low scores, offer recourse to an intermediate range of scores, and accept applicants with high scores outright. Because the intermediate range spans the cutoff that would separate acceptance from rejection when recourse is not available, some marginal applicants gain a new path to acceptance, while others---who would have been accepted outright---must now clear a costly hurdle.
Authors 2
Matthew Olckers, Toby Walsh
Specification
- Official page
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 2 h agohigh
- Arxiv announce type
- replace
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 2 h agohigh
- arXiv id
- 2301.12884
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 2 h agohigh
- Categories
- cs.GT, cs.AI
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 2 h agohigh
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 2 h agohigh
- Primary category
- cs.GT
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 2 h agohigh
- Published
- 11 Sept 2026
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 2 h agohigh
Each value shows its source, tier and observation time. Conflicting claims are kept side by side and flagged — never averaged. How AI Atlas records facts →
Provenance
Attributed facts
9
Source tiers
T19
Freshest observation
2 h ago
Conflicts
None
No models linked to this paper yet.
- Authors
- Matthew Olckers, Toby Walsh
As of
Rewind the record: see this entity's attributes exactly as AI Atlas knew them on a given day.
Claim history · Abstract
Abstractabstract1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| -cross Abstract: Algorithmic recourse promises to help applicants rejected by automated systems by explaining the changes needed to secure acceptance. What incentive do decision-makers, such as banks and employers, have to offer recourse? We study this question in a screening model in which recourse is both productive and selective: completing recourse improves an applicant's value to the decision-maker, but applicants differ in their cost of completion. The optimal policy is a threshold rule: reject applicants with low scores, offer recourse to an intermediate range of scores, and accept applicants with high scores outright. Because the intermediate range spans the cutoff that would separate acceptance from rejection when recourse is not available, some marginal applicants gain a new path to acceptance, while others---who would have been accepted outright---must now clear a costly hurdle. | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Claims are temporal and append-only: a new observation closes the previous claim (valid_to) instead of overwriting it. Conflicting claims from different sources are kept side by side and flagged — never averaged. Methodology →
New paper: Incentives to Offer Algorithmic Recourse
arxiv
| Source | Document | Type | Tier | Last observed | Snapshots |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| arXiv (Atom API + RSS) | rss.arxiv.org/rss/cs.AI | feed | T1· Official | 2 h ago | 1 |
Tier 1 = official/primary, 2 = quality secondary, 3 = community, 4 = unverified. Every snapshot is archived; see all sources and the methodology.