Updated 50 min ago · first seen 11 Sept 2026
paper_01M294GPCR19REVGSCT4TAV95R
- Published
- 11 Sept 2026
- T1 · 50 min ago
- arXiv
- 2301.12884
- T1 · 50 min ago
- Category
- cs.GT
- T1 · 50 min ago
Abstract
-cross Abstract: Algorithmic recourse promises to help applicants rejected by automated systems by explaining the changes needed to secure acceptance. What incentive do decision-makers, such as banks and employers, have to offer recourse? We study this question in a screening model in which recourse is both productive and selective: completing recourse improves an applicant's value to the decision-maker, but applicants differ in their cost of completion. The optimal policy is a threshold rule: reject applicants with low scores, offer recourse to an intermediate range of scores, and accept applicants with high scores outright. Because the intermediate range spans the cutoff that would separate acceptance from rejection when recourse is not available, some marginal applicants gain a new path to acceptance, while others---who would have been accepted outright---must now clear a costly hurdle.
Authors 2
Matthew Olckers, Toby Walsh
Specification
- Official page
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 50 min agohigh
- Arxiv announce type
- replace
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 50 min agohigh
- arXiv id
- 2301.12884
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 50 min agohigh
- Categories
- cs.GT, cs.AI
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 50 min agohigh
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 50 min agohigh
- Primary category
- cs.GT
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 50 min agohigh
- Published
- 11 Sept 2026
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 50 min agohigh
Each value shows its source, tier and observation time. Conflicting claims are kept side by side and flagged — never averaged. How AI Atlas records facts →
Provenance
Attributed facts
9
Source tiers
T19
Freshest observation
50 min ago
Conflicts
None
No models linked to this paper yet.
- Authors
- Matthew Olckers, Toby Walsh
As of
Rewind the record: see this entity's attributes exactly as AI Atlas knew them on a given day.
Claim history
Official pageofficial_url1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.12884 | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Abstractabstract1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| -cross Abstract: Algorithmic recourse promises to help applicants rejected by automated systems by explaining the changes needed to secure acceptance. What incentive do decision-makers, such as banks and employers, have to offer recourse? We study this question in a screening model in which recourse is both productive and selective: completing recourse improves an applicant's value to the decision-maker, but applicants differ in their cost of completion. The optimal policy is a threshold rule: reject applicants with low scores, offer recourse to an intermediate range of scores, and accept applicants with high scores outright. Because the intermediate range spans the cutoff that would separate acceptance from rejection when recourse is not available, some marginal applicants gain a new path to acceptance, while others---who would have been accepted outright---must now clear a costly hurdle. | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Arxiv announce typearxiv_announce_type1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| replace | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
arXiv idarxiv_id1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2301.12884 | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Categoriescategories1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| cs.GT, cs.AI | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
PDFpdf_url1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| https://arxiv.org/pdf/2301.12884 | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Primary categoryprimary_category1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| cs.GT | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Publishedpublished_at1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11 Sept 2026 | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Claims are temporal and append-only: a new observation closes the previous claim (valid_to) instead of overwriting it. Conflicting claims from different sources are kept side by side and flagged — never averaged. Methodology →
New paper: Incentives to Offer Algorithmic Recourse
arxiv
| Source | Document | Type | Tier | Last observed | Snapshots |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| arXiv (Atom API + RSS) | rss.arxiv.org/rss/cs.AI | feed | T1· Official | 50 min ago | 1 |
Tier 1 = official/primary, 2 = quality secondary, 3 = community, 4 = unverified. Every snapshot is archived; see all sources and the methodology.