'Ghaib in Translation' aka Unseen Harm: Measuring Cross-Script Safety Inconsistency with 'Missed-in-Urdu' Scores in LLM Hate Speech Detection
Updated 52 min ago · first seen 11 Sept 2026
paper_01M294GQF8SKAS8PJRDNSXHM4P
- Published
- 11 Sept 2026
- T1 · 52 min ago
- arXiv
- 2608.24191
- T1 · 52 min ago
- Category
- cs.CL
- T1 · 52 min ago
Abstract
-cross Abstract: Urdu, the world's tenth most spoken language with 246 million speakers, remains almost entirely absent from mainstream LLM safety evaluation and nine years of WOAH proceedings. To investigate whether this absence has measurable consequences for content moderation reliability, five large language models, GPT-4o, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Qwen-2.5, and Llama-3.1, were tested across six datasets spanning Nastaliq Urdu, Roman Urdu, English, and code-switched Urdu-English. Across the five Urdu-script datasets, label instability between original-script and English-translation classification ranged from 15.9% (Gemini 2.5 Flash) to 31.6% (Qwen-2.5), with a 'Missed-in-Urdu' rate, content flagged as harmful in English translation but passed as normal in the original script, ranging from 2.4% to 9.9% (median 4.3%). A complete enumeration of all 205 papers across nine ALW/WOAH editions via the ACL Anthology API confirms zero dedicated Urdu papers across the entire period. Results indicate that current LLMs provide uneven safety assurance across Urdu's script varieties, with smaller open-weight models showing substantially higher instability and missed-harm rates than frontier closed models.
Authors 4
Fawzia Zehra (Fuzzy), Kara-Isitt, Sonal Khosla, Stephen Swift
Specification
- Official page
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 52 min agohigh
- Arxiv announce type
- replace
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 52 min agohigh
- arXiv id
- 2608.24191
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 52 min agohigh
- Categories
- cs.CL, cs.AI
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 52 min agohigh
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 52 min agohigh
- Primary category
- cs.CL
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 52 min agohigh
- Published
- 11 Sept 2026
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 52 min agohigh
Each value shows its source, tier and observation time. Conflicting claims are kept side by side and flagged — never averaged. How AI Atlas records facts →
Provenance
Attributed facts
9
Source tiers
T19
Freshest observation
52 min ago
Conflicts
None
No models linked to this paper yet.
- Authors
- Fawzia Zehra (Fuzzy), Kara-Isitt, Sonal Khosla
As of
Rewind the record: see this entity's attributes exactly as AI Atlas knew them on a given day.
Claim history
Official pageofficial_url1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24191 | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Abstractabstract1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| -cross Abstract: Urdu, the world's tenth most spoken language with 246 million speakers, remains almost entirely absent from mainstream LLM safety evaluation and nine years of WOAH proceedings. To investigate whether this absence has measurable consequences for content moderation reliability, five large language models, GPT-4o, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Qwen-2.5, and Llama-3.1, were tested across six datasets spanning Nastaliq Urdu, Roman Urdu, English, and code-switched Urdu-English. Across the five Urdu-script datasets, label instability between original-script and English-translation classification ranged from 15.9% (Gemini 2.5 Flash) to 31.6% (Qwen-2.5), with a 'Missed-in-Urdu' rate, content flagged as harmful in English translation but passed as normal in the original script, ranging from 2.4% to 9.9% (median 4.3%). A complete enumeration of all 205 papers across nine ALW/WOAH editions via the ACL Anthology API confirms zero dedicated Urdu papers across the entire period. Results indicate that current LLMs provide uneven safety assurance across Urdu's script varieties, with smaller open-weight models showing substantially higher instability and missed-harm rates than frontier closed models. | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Arxiv announce typearxiv_announce_type1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| replace | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
arXiv idarxiv_id1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2608.24191 | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Categoriescategories1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| cs.CL, cs.AI | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
PDFpdf_url1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| https://arxiv.org/pdf/2608.24191 | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Primary categoryprimary_category1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| cs.CL | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Publishedpublished_at1
| Value | Valid from → to | Status | Source | Confidence | Extractor |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 11 Sept 2026 | → current | current | arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1 | high | deterministic |
Claims are temporal and append-only: a new observation closes the previous claim (valid_to) instead of overwriting it. Conflicting claims from different sources are kept side by side and flagged — never averaged. Methodology →
New paper: 'Ghaib in Translation' aka Unseen Harm: Measuring Cross-Script Safety Inconsistency with 'Missed-in-Urdu' Scores in LLM Hate Speech Detection
arxiv
| Source | Document | Type | Tier | Last observed | Snapshots |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| arXiv (Atom API + RSS) | rss.arxiv.org/rss/cs.AI | feed | T1· Official | 52 min ago | 1 |
Tier 1 = official/primary, 2 = quality secondary, 3 = community, 4 = unverified. Every snapshot is archived; see all sources and the methodology.