AgentAudit: An Open, Extensible Framework for Full-Lifecycle Trust Evaluation of AI Agents
Updated 6 h ago · first seen 11 Sept 2026
paper_01M294GKBF6DXAHBC3EAA1GP92
- Published
- 11 Sept 2026
- T1 · 6 h ago
- arXiv
- 2609.09875
- T1 · 6 h ago
- Category
- cs.AI
- T1 · 6 h ago
Abstract
Existing evaluation frameworks mostly assess only one part of AI agents, such as task completion (AgentBench) or security robustness (AgentDojo, ASB), rather than the complete pipeline of planning, tool selection, tool execution, memory and reasoning. Failures can occur at any stage, yet existing benchmarks rarely identify their precise source. AgentAudit evaluates the entire execution trace across ten capability, grounding, security and behavioural dimensions, namely instruction integrity, planner, memory, tool selection, tool invocation, tool correctness, alignment, tool faithfulness, security and execution integrity, combined with behavioural classification and failure attribution to pinpoint the exact stage responsible for an observed failure. AgentAudit can evaluate any LLM-based AI agent, since it attaches to the agent instead of replacing it. It reads only the recorded execution trace and does not interfere with how the agent runs, so it places no constraint on the agent's internal implementation. We evaluate five language models (OpenAI GPT-5, Claude Sonnet 5, Sarvam 105B, Llama 3.3 70B and Gemini 2.5 Flash) across nine capability and adversarial tasks. Claude Sonnet 5 and GPT-5 obtain the highest mean Composite Trust Scores (95.1 and 80.6 out of 100, respectively), while Sarvam 105B, Llama 3.3 70B and Gemini 2.5 Flash trail substantially (57.6, 45.7 and 22.6). All traces were scored by a single fixed judge model, which was itself one of the evaluated models, a limitation discussed in Section VII.E. More importantly, models with similar task-completion behaviour can diverge sharply in trustworthiness, as several non-frontier models are repeatedly classified Unsafe_Compliance on adversarial tasks rather than merely failing them, a distinction that pass/fail benchmarks cannot surface.
Authors 5
Shrey Nag, Sachita, Abhishek Kumar Singh, Lipi Goel, Rajeshwar Singh Janwar
Specification
- Official page
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 6 h agohigh
- Arxiv announce type
- new
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 6 h agohigh
- arXiv id
- 2609.09875
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 6 h agohigh
- Categories
- cs.AI
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 6 h agohigh
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 6 h agohigh
- Primary category
- cs.AI
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 6 h agohigh
- Published
- 11 Sept 2026
Source:arXiv (Atom API + RSS)T1observed 6 h agohigh
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Attributed facts
9
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T19
Freshest observation
6 h ago
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None
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- Authors
- Shrey Nag, Sachita, Abhishek Kumar Singh
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Claims are temporal and append-only: a new observation closes the previous claim (valid_to) instead of overwriting it. Conflicting claims from different sources are kept side by side and flagged — never averaged. Methodology →
- New paperPaperAgentAudit: An Open, Extensible Framework for Full-Lifecycle Trust Evaluation of AI Agents
New paper: AgentAudit: An Open, Extensible Framework for Full-Lifecycle Trust Evaluation of AI Agents
arxiv
| Source | Document | Type | Tier | Last observed | Snapshots |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| arXiv (Atom API + RSS) | rss.arxiv.org/rss/cs.AI | feed | T1· Official | 4 h ago | 1 |
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